Rochdale have had a tremendous start to the National League season. Jimmy McNulty’s side currently sit in 5th position, having picked up 24 points from their opening 13 matches, scoring 22 goals and only conceding 11 in the process.
After an eleventh-placed finish last season, I suggested that Rochdale could be one of the sides to watch this year because of the possession-based style that McNulty has implemented (my initial analysis can be read here
This season, McNulty has devised a brand new 3-2-5 build-up structure. In this in-depth article, I examine the structure; weigh up the pros and cons it has to his overall system; and provide an updated analysis of his Rochdale side’s chances this season.
In-possession
Last season, Rochdale typically built play from defence with a 4-2-4 structure (as we can see below). This 4-2-4 would then transition into a 3-2-5 shape once Rochdale had reached the final-third, with their left-back pushing forwards into the last line.
The issue with this system, however, was that Rochdale only had four players in the last line during the initial phase of their build-up. This meant that it was easier for opposition defenders to track their forwards, as they weren’t overloaded numerically. Also, if Rochdale attacked at speed, it was difficult for them to get their left-back up the pitch straight away in order to support the attack. This meant that, in these instances, they would attack with just four players in the last line and would be under-resourced in the final-third.
There were also matches last season where Rochdale built play in a 3-2-5 shape. This involved them using their left wing-back to hold the width, with their right wing-back, Jimmy Keohane, inverting into the half-space (below). Although this allowed them to attack with five players in the last line quicker, and more regularly, it did mean that two of their front-five were defensive-minded players. Whilst the structure was good, it wasn’t elite.
This season, McNulty has devised a brand new variation of this 3-2-5 build-up structure. Tobi Adebayo-Rowling now holds the width on the right-side; Tarryn Allarakhia holds the width on the left-side; Connor McBride tucks inside into the right half-space; Devante Rodney is in the left half-space; and Kairo Mitchell is the centre-forward.
Further back, Aaron Henry has joined on loan to provide competition for Ryan East and Harvey Gilmour in the double-pivot; Sam Beckwith is the left-sided centre-back; Kyron Gordon is the right-sided centre-back; and captain Ethan Ebanks-Landell is the central centre-back ahead of goalkeeper Luke McNicholas.
So what exactly are the benefits to this 3-2-5 structure?
This 3-2-5 shape (below) allows Rochdale to have players in close proximity during the build-up, as well as having sufficient numbers in the last line. Five players are positioned deep, and five players are high. The close proximity of the deeper players – who are all comfortable on the ball – allows them to combine quickly, retain possession, and exert control on matches. Then, in the final-third, the front-five can overload opposition back-fours with ease. Additionally, because they have players spread evenly across all five vertical zones, these players can easily combine and interchange positions.
But let’s have a more in-depth look at Rochdale’s front-five in action…
In an away match at Aldershot Town, we can see how a run into the half-space was pivotal in allowing Rochdale to create an overload out wide, before enabling them to cross the ball into the penalty area which led to their second goal (below).
In a match at home to Braintree Town, a similar move transpired. However, this time it was a pass from the half-space which was met by Adebayo-Rowling (below). He got in-behind the defensive line and crossed the ball into the penalty area which led to a goal. By having all five vertical zones occupied at all times, these combinations can happen much more regularly for Rochdale compared to if they attacked with just four in the last line.
Also, because Rochdale’s outside centre-back roles are filled by players who are equally comfortable playing as full-backs in Gordon and Beckwith, these players can often get forward to support the attack. This means that Rochdale often attack in a 2-3-5 instead, and can create offensive triangles out wide by having their wing-back, outside centre-back and ball-side #10 combine.
But Rochdale don’t always attack in a 3-2-5 structure. Depending on the positioning of central-midfielder Gilmour, their shape could even be interpreted as a 3-1-6!
Again versus Aldershot, below, we can see how Gilmour pushed into the last line to overload Aldershot’s defence (6v5). Once he received the ball from Gordon, Gilmour quickly played a first-time pass out to the right-side, the ball was crossed into the penalty area, and Rochdale scored. The overload caused confusion for Aldershot’s defenders, and the close proximity allowed Gilmour to find his teammate quickly with ease.
In fact, it’s not just in the final-third where Rochdale’s shape can be interpreted as a 3-1-6. Even during their build-up, a central-midfielder can push higher so that the double-pivot is staggered at different ‘heights’. This makes the pivot more difficult to mark for opponents and, because there are fewer players centrally clogging up the midfield, it also opens up passing lanes into the forward players – as we can see below.
It’s important to note, though, that although Rochdale have tremendous technical quality in-possession which allows them control matches with the ball, mistakes will still happen occasionally. This shouldn’t mean that a change of approach should be encouraged, however. The pros of McNulty’s in-possession system far outweigh the cons – especially so when we consider his out-of-possession approach, which I will speak about in a moment.
First, it’s also important to recognise that, even when Rochdale are unable to exert control on matches with the ball, they also offer a dangerous threat in transition. Rodney and McBride, in particular, are top transitional threats for this level, and they give Rochdale an alternative method of scoring goals as opposed to only being dangerous through a high-possession style.
Out-of-possession
What about Rochdale’s out-of-possession approach, then? They have only conceded 11 goals in 13 matches so far this season, keeping seven clean sheets in the process. But what’s the structure like?
When we examine the effects McNulty’s new 3-2-5 system has out-of-possession, the benefits continue. The evenly distributed front-five gives Rochdale sufficient numbers all across the pitch ready to counter-press if play breaks down, and the ‘3-2’ part of the structure allows Rochdale to have two central-midfielders positioned on the edge of the penalty area who can challenge for duels in order to prevent opposition counter-attacks.
Further back, the back-three gives them nice coverage across the pitch so that they can easily shift out wide to defend passes played into the channels. Additionally, the inclusion of Gordon and Beckwith – two aggressive defenders who are comfortable defending large spaces – on the outside of the back-three helps Rochdale deal with counter-attacks. If these players were more passive defenders, who like to sit back and assess the bigger picture before acting, they may not be as suited to these roles when defending transitions.
However, their profiles do have the potential to be exploited. As both Gordon and Beckwith like to get forward to support the attack, if play breaks down and Rochdale’s counter-press is unsuccessful, they may find themselves out of position. This has the potential to be exploited, as Rochdale would now only have two players defending in the last line, as opposed to three.
But what about in the settled defensive moment?
Last season, irrespective of Rochdale’s build-up shape, they defended in a 5-4-1. If they achieved this with their 4-2-4 build, their left-winger would drop into the last line. This season, Rochdale’s wing-backs – Adebayo-Rowling and Allarakhia – drop into the last line when out-of-possession, still enabling them to defend in the same 5-4-1 shape.
This means that Ebanks-Landell now defends as the central centre-back, which profiles him perfectly. Last season, he would be used as the right-sided centre-back in Rochdale’s back-four; but then once Rochdale’s left-winger dropped into the last line, Ebanks-Landell would then be playing to the right of centre in Rochdale’s back-five. This wasn’t ideal as he would often have to assist his wing-back to defend the wide spaces, as opposed to defending the central space which suits his physical profile better.
These wide spaces are now helped to be defended by Gordon and Beckwith, who fit the physical requirements for the roles much better due to their superior athleticism.
Because Allarakhia is used as Rochdale’s left wing-back, it does mean that he has to drop into the last line when his side are out-of-possession. This has the potential to be exploited, as Allarakhia is naturally a forward-thinking player and doesn’t have the same defensive mindset that a natural wing-back or full-back would have. Also, because Allarakhia is right-footed, he often struggles to defend with his left-foot when opposing wingers go past him on the outside.
But what about in the high pressing moment?
In my previous analysis of McNulty’s Rochdale, which I wrote in pre-season, I had some question marks over his ability to implement a successful high press.
McNulty sets Rochdale up in a mid-block as opposed to regularly wanting to press high with aggression. This means that, when Rochdale do press high, it’s more difficult for them to do so because the mindset is to be cautious and sit in a compact mid-block.
Let’s have a look at some examples of Rochdale’s press…
Rochdale mix between marking zonally and man-to-man from opposition goal-kicks. Against York City earlier this season, Rochdale allowed York just one additional player to be free from their goal-kicks (below). This consequently allowed Rochdale to have one additional player closer to their own goal defending. This is an aggressive approach, and makes it difficult for Rochdale’s opponents to ‘play out’ from goal-kicks.
Sticking with the York match, but this time from open-play, below we can see how Rochdale managed to press York’s 4-2-4 build in man-to-man fashion. This involved Rodney inverting to press one of the centre-backs, with Allarakhia jumping to press the right-back. That’s the benefit of having Allarakhia – a natural forward-thinking player – defending as a wing-back. It allows Rochdale to alter their pressing approach with ease, and switch between a back-four or back-five depending on how they want to press.
With Rochdale pressing in man-to-man fashion all across the pitch in this moment, it made it difficult for York to ‘play out’, which resulted in them ‘going long’ to challenge for duels, rather than building safely. A top approach from Rochdale.
Here’s another example from the York match. This time, York built in a 4-1-5 shape (below) with a #6, Dan Batty, dropping into the first line, and their right-back pushing high. Rodney still pressed York’s centre-back, who had pushed out to the right, and Gilmour jumped to press the York pivot player. This time, however, Rochdale had forced York to one side, and McBride could invert to press the remaining centre-back. This left York’s left-back free, but he couldn’t be reached. As a result, Rochdale had an additional player close to their own goal, whilst also applying good pressure to York’s build-up. Another good approach.
In another match, Aldershot built in a 3-2-5 shape, and Rochdale’s 5-2-3 press could easily match up in man-to-man fashion. This allowed them to apply optimal pressure on Aldershot’s build-up.
But what about when Rochdale’s players can’t jump to press?
Below, we can see how York again built in a 4-1-5 shape. The front five pinned Rochdale into a back-five, which meant that Allarakhia couldn’t jump to press. Consequently, Rodney had to mark out wide which meant that Mitchell was easily overloaded 2v1. From here, York could find the spare man with ease and progress.
Again, below, a similar problem. This time, a Rochdale central-midfielder wasn’t able to jump to press quickly enough, which left Mitchell outnumbered 3v1. York could again manipulate Rochdale’s press and retain possession.
And below, with a Rochdale central-midfielder reluctant to press, and with Rochdale’s other players already occupied, it allowed Aldershot to find the spare man and progress.
It’s much more difficult to switch from a mid-block into a high press with consistency, compared to the other way around, as the mindset is to be cautious to begin with. If you’re aggressive in the press to begin with, and apply pressure high up the pitch before dropping back into the mid-block, it’s easier to reliably apply pressure. They’re two different mentalities.
Specific to Rochdale, their central-midfielders are often reluctant to press with aggression and are more likely to be passive to begin with, before sometimes jumping to press. However, even if Rochdale’s central-midfielders do jump to press, they can still be exploited due to the lack of intensity in the first line of the press.
Here, we can see how a Rochdale midfielder had followed an Aldershot #6 to apply pressure, forcing him to pass back towards his own goal.
However, due to the lack of intensity shown from Rochdale’s front players, Aldershot still managed to find a #10 who was between the lines, who the Rochdale midfielder had left behind to press higher. Even then, with Rochdale’s other central-midfielder already occupied, a defender could have stepped into the midfield to press the #10, but didn’t.
And finally, versus York, Rochdale’s central-midfielders were positioned higher after applying pressure. However, due to the lack of intensity from the front players, Batty was able to play a long pass over the top of Rochdale’s defensive line into the channel.
Due to the advanced positioning of Rochdale’s central-midfielders, they couldn’t recover quickly enough and, once the ball was played back to the edge of the penalty area, York’s #10 who was between the lines could meet the cross and finish with a first-time effort.
Conclusion
McNulty’s high press will work against the majority of sides in the National League, because there won’t be too many who will have the ability to play through the pressure with consistency. Then, when Rochdale have the ball themselves, their technical quality will enable them to control matches through possession.
However, what about when Rochdale come up against the very best possession-based sides in the division? York City, Barnet and Gateshead. These are sides who not only have tremendous technical ability to play through anything less than an optimal high pressing approach, but they also apply maximum pressure themselves – as illustrated by the following chart.
McNulty has implemented a successful mid-block at Rochdale, and they have one of the very best defensive records in the division so far. His in-possession structure is elite, but his high press doesn’t allow Rochdale to exert optimal control on matches in the same way that the other top sides do. Even then, though, they still have transitional threats that can win them matches even when they fail to exert control. But how sustainable is this reliance on individual transitional threats to win them matches against the very best sides in the division?
Although the signs are very promising for Rochdale and, as I predicted in pre-season, they look to have more than enough for a top-seven finish, McNulty’s side won’t be able to be classed as truly elite until they consistently apply pressure high up the pitch more effectively. This is the next step for McNulty from a tactical perspective.
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