Phil Parkinson led Altrincham to a fourth-place National League finish last season – their highest league finish in over 30 years. As we head into the 2024/25 season, in this in-depth article, I’ll analyse Altrincham’s style of play under Parkinson; assess his in-possession and out-of-possession approaches; and determine whether his tactics are sustainable enough to keep them competing towards the top of the division.
In-possession
Altrincham usually line up in a 4-2-3-1 formation, and they aim to ‘play out’ from defence. They have a double-pivot in midfield that sits ahead of their back-four, forming a ‘4-2’ shape in the first phase of build-up.
During the build-up, Altrincham can position their double-pivot deeper, closer to their two centre-backs, creating a ‘box’ shape. This deeper positioning attempts to bait the opposition press, drawing opponents closer to their goal, leaving opposing defences isolated versus Altrincham’s ‘front-four’.
From goal-kicks, Altrincham follow the same principle. They look to ‘play out’ with short passes, but are also happy to take an ‘open-kick’. This is where a side set up to take a short goal-kick, before the goalkeeper plays long, over the opposition; and is different from a ‘closed-kick’, which is where the goalkeeper launches the goal-kick, with the defenders pushed up to the half-way line.
Further forwards, Altrincham position their #10 between their opponents’ defensive and midfield lines; and push their wingers into the last line, either side of their centre-forward. This creates more of a 4-2-1-3 shape during the build-up, allowing Altrincham to play at four ‘heights’.
By positioning players at four different ‘heights’, it presents the opposition with a tactical issue. With players positioned between the three defensive lines, how does the defending side deal with this? Do they press aggressively and leave a player free between the lines; or do they set up with a slightly more passive approach to take care of the player between the lines, but consequently allow Altrincham more time on the ball?
This is different to dropping a striker into the midfield, too. In this instance, it’s likely a defender could just follow them and step into the midfield when they drop off, rather than needing someone to take care of the player who is positioned constantly between the lines.
But it’s not just Altrincham’s #10 who can be positioned between the lines. Their left-winger, Alex Newby, often inverts into the midfield. As Altrincham’s #10 is given the freedom to roam across the pitch, he may occupy the space that the left-winger vacated; or Altrincham may now have two players between the lines, after the inversion.
This, again, gives the opposition tactical issues to deal with. If Newby inverts, does the defending side invert their right-back, to follow Newby into an unfamiliar midfield position; or keep him marking zonally, potentially leaving Newby free? And if the #10 and Newby rotate, does the defending side man-mark them, leaving players in unfamiliar areas; or mark zonally, giving them more space and time on the ball?
In a match last season versus Rochdale, this was present. Above, we can see Altrincham’s left-winger, Newby, in a central area. Rochdale’s two central-midfielders were passive in their positioning so that they didn’t give Newby space between the lines, but the distances they had to cover in order to press Altrincham’s double-pivot were too great, allowing them too much time on the ball.
One potential reason for Rochdale’s cautious approach to the press in this particular match, may have been due to Altrincham’s threat in offensive transition. Altrincham have some very direct profiles in attack, who excel in transitional moments. Newby, Justin Amaluzor, Matty Kosylo and Chris Conn-Clarke (who has recently joined Peterborough United) are all quick, dynamic players who are very dangerous when attacking space.
Although Conn-Clarke and Kosylo are both #10 profiles, there were matches where all four players were included in Altrincham’s starting eleven. Conn-Clarke was sometimes used as a false-nine, giving Altrincham another direct profile in attack, although this meant that Altrincham had no players who could effectively lead the line.
There are consequences to having too many direct profiles in the same side, though. These players, typically, aren’t able to play the high volume of passes necessary to maintain possession of the ball, as their first thought when they receive the ball is to attack. This means that sides with too many direct profiles in their eleven will likely struggle to keep possession and control matches with the ball, and limit the frequency at which they are asked to defend deep by the opposition. This makes it incredibly difficult to exert optimal control on matches and, therefore, challenge for league titles.
The fact that Altrincham’s double-pivot often drops deeper, further away from the ‘front-four’, adds to this issue, as the distances between the players are too great in order to keep possession to a top standard. Altrincham averaged a 52.2% possession share last season, which ranked them 9th across the whole of the division. However, Altrincham had just a 67.3% progressive pass completion rate (%), ranking them 21st.
Compared to the top possession-based sides in the National League, Altrincham’s completion rate was much lower. Title-winners, Chesterfield, were accurate with 77% of their progressive passes; Barnet, 75%; Gateshead, 74.4%; Southend United, 74.1%; and Rochdale with 70.8% of theirs. This supports the idea that the distances between Altrincham’s midfield and attack are too great for them to maintain possession of the ball to a high standard.
Although they have these dangerous, direct profiles in attack, one side that did successfully manage to implement an aggressive high-press against Altrincham last season was Boreham Wood. They utilised a man-to-man pressing structure, and had physical profiles all across the pitch, helping them to press Altrincham with intensity and aggression.
This meant that Altrincham were often forced to ‘go long’ and challenge for duels. However, they lacked the physicality to consistently win these aerial duels and loose-ball duels, meaning Boreham Wood could quite often turn possession over, and initiate attacks of their own. Although, as there were 1v1 battles all over the pitch due to Boreham Wood’s press, in the event that Altrincham won these 1v1 duels, their dynamic, direct players could cause issues in transition.
In the settled attacking moment, Altrincham demonstrate a great deal of positional fluidity. Their full-backs will often fly forwards into the last line, a central-midfielder may join the attack, and the ball-side centre-back may even push out to support his full-back or winger. A full-back may hold the width with the winger inverted, or vice-versa, and the #10 has the freedom to roam horizontally across the pitch. There is a huge amount of movement in the final-third, which makes it difficult for defending sides to keep track of the positioning of their opponents.
However, Parkinson’s fluid approach does have consequences. Too much fluidity in the final-third may mean that all vertical spaces aren’t consistently occupied; with these being the left and right wide spaces, the left and right half-spaces, and central space; which makes it difficult to implement a successful counter-press. In the event that play breaks down in the final-third, Altrincham’s fluidity may allow their opponents to play through their counter-press, and get out of trouble. This, again, makes it difficult for Altrincham to sustain attacks and exert optimal control on matches.
Out-of-possession
Altrincham push their #10 forwards when they are without the ball, giving them a 4-4-2 out-of-possession shape. They can press in man-to-man fashion in the high-press, whether that be from opposition goal-kicks or build-up; and they have a couple of ways in which they can achieve this.
Against Rochdale, who built play in a 4-2-4 shape, Altrincham pushed their #10 into the first line to press them in man-to-man fashion all across the pitch. Below, we can see Altrincham’s double-pivot marking Rochdale’s double-pivot aggressively; with their front-two marking Rochdale’s two centre-backs; and wingers marking the full-backs.
Against Gateshead, Altrincham followed a similar approach. Here, we can see Altrincham’s front-three marking Gateshead’s back-three; but the #10 has dropped from the first line of the press to mark Gateshead’s #6, instead. Altrincham’s double-pivot went man-to-man against Gateshead’s #8’s; and we can also see centre-back, Jake Cooper, step into the midfield to man-mark Gateshead’s #10.
This, again, left Altrincham pressing in man-to-man fashion all across the pitch, and went some way to ensuring that they had a majority possession share of 53% in this match. Although, last season, Gateshead had the highest average possession share in the whole division (62%), in this particular match, they only saw 47% of the ball.
Whilst a man-to-man press, if carried out successfully, can put opponents under intense pressure, it does have some tactical consequences. A full man-to-man press, right the way across the pitch, leaves you with numerical parity in the last line of defence (e.g. 4v4). If a centre-back is tasked with stepping into the midfield, this can leave the remaining centre-back isolated, 1v1 against his opponent, whilst also having to defend a large amount of space.
This means that the players require a great deal of athleticism and physicality; not just in defence, but in every position, as there are 1v1 duels all over the pitch. If one duel is lost, or a player is dribbled past, it leaves the next player having to defend two players at once, and the whole structure is broken. I’ve already identified that Altrincham lack physicality throughout their side, particularly in attack and out wide, and I’m not sure that centre-back Lewis Baines is the ideal athlete needed to defend the large space in the middle of defence that opens up when Cooper steps into midfield.
This approach also requires players with the correct mentality, as every single player on the pitch needs to ‘buy in’ to the man-to-man press. If one player doesn’t press their player with enough intensity, or doesn’t track back, they may contribute to the failing of the system. Runs from deep are also a potential issue for man-to-man presses, as midfield runners may go unmarked when making runs beyond the defensive line.
When they are forced back into their mid-block, Altrincham move into more of a zonal-marking block, rather than the man-marking high-press. They sit in a 4-4-2 mid-block with natural wingers on either side of the pitch. These wingers and #10 give them outlets when they are defending deep, as they are all direct players who can get them up the pitch, and are a threat in transitional moments.
Perhaps unsurprisingly so, Altrincham do seem fairly keen to drop back into their mid-block, rather than continuing to press in man-to-man fashion after they have taken the lead. Although possibly a pragmatic approach by Parkinson, it can relinquish some control and allow the opposition more of the ball.
When they are asked to defend deep, as has been previously mentioned, Altrincham lack the physicality to be able to defend their penalty area to a top standard. Altrincham conceded 62 goals last season, ranking them 7th in the National League, compared to an expected figure of 68.06 xG Against (17th). This isn’t a huge difference, although Altrincham were slightly on the right end of this variance by around six goals. However, Altrincham faced 618 shots against last season, ranking them 21st.
This is an incredibly high number of shots to have faced, and is a result of their failure to implement a successful (counter-)press, and reliance on offensive transitions over settled attacking moments.
Although the high-press structure of Parkinson’s has the potential to be compact due to the shape, he doesn’t have the profiles in his side to implement this to a top standard, because they lack physicality; and his fluid approach in the final-third means that Altrincham can find it difficult to counter-press effectively.
Altrincham, on average, allowed their opponents 13.6 passes per defensive action (PPDA) last season, which ranked them 23rd. This means that for every defensive action that Altrincham made in their opponents’ 60% of the pitch, the opposition played over 13 passes – which is a high amount of passes. This illustrates how Altrincham’s press isn’t particularly effective. Barnet only allowed their opponents 7.98 passes per defensive action (PPDA), ranking them 1st; Gateshead, 9.2 (3rd); Chesterfield, 9.34 (5th); and Southend allowed 10.74 (10th).
Conclusion
To summarise, Altrincham have the profiles to cause any side in the National League huge problems in transitional moments. Their direct profiles in attack and Parkinson’s over-fluid approach in the final-third can be difficult to defend against, although it isn’t conducive to a successful counter-pressing structure; and they lack the correct profiles to implement an effective high-press. This means that they often struggle to maintain possession and sustain attacks, and have a lot of defending to do.
The issue is that Altrincham need to take part in these defensive moments, in order to manufacture those transitional moments in attack which they are so dangerous from. This begs the question, is this a sustainable way of playing, and can it take Altrincham to the next level?
Last season, Altrincham scored 85 goals against an expected figure of 67.26 xG. A large reason for the number of goals they scored, and over-performance in-front of goal, was due to former player Conn-Clarke. He accumulated 35 goal involvements against an expected figure of 26.61. To replace a player of this quality will be an impossible task for Parkinson. Conn-Clarke is a true National League ‘all-timer’. That’s not to say that they can’t bring in a similar profile or improve their squad elsewhere, though.
The style that Parkinson has implemented at Altrincham, which is too reliant on transitional moments, is not conducive to controlling matches; sustaining attacks; and challenging for league titles. Even in a season in which they had one of the best National League players of all time in their side, Altrincham still finished fourth.
However, they could still finish in the play-off positions which, due to their incredible threat in transition, could see them win promotion by winning a number of one-off matches. In order to make it back-to-back top-seven finishes, Altrincham still need to add more quality to their starting eleven, and more depth to their squad. Although another play-off campaign could be a possibility, I would expect to see Altrincham finish outside of the top-seven this season.
Joe Payne - @ShrimperStats
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